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COMMENT
CONTROLLING BLUE SKIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
WHO IS THE AIR QUALITY POSSE - TRIBES OR
STATES? THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CLEAN AIR




When the issue of controlling pollution on Indian reservations' arises,
native nations, the federal government, and individual states all assert
governing interests. As a result, perplexing issues of federal law, native
self-determination, and state autonomy arise.?
Congress enacted environmental laws to protect and enhance human
health and environmental integrity. However, in doing so Congress
failed to consider and neglected to mention tribes and the role they
would play in regulating the environment on tribal lands. This oversight
affected nearly a million people residing on over fifty-six million acres
of land comprising 281 reservations. 3 From this omission emerged the
legal issue of who should regulate environmental protection on Indian
lands.
Until enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (the
1990 Amendments), 4 it was unclear as to who - tribes or states -
* Third-year law student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. B.A., 1989,
University of California at Berkeley. Recipient, 1991-92 American Indian Law Review
Outstanding Note Award.
This comment was selected for publication and for the award before Ms. Reding became
1992-93 Note Editor. The author gratefully acknowledges Mark Chandler, Director of
Indian Affairs, United States Environmental Protection Agency for Region 6C, for his
cordial and continuous assistance.
1. The word "reservation" will be used interchangeably with the terms "tribal land"
and "Indian country." The author, however, acknowledges and discusses the legal dis-
tinctions between the terms. See infra text accompanying notes 174-76.
2. Judith V. Royster & Rory Snowarrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation En-
vironment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64
WAsH. L. REv. 581 (1989).
3. Donald R. Wharton, Implementation of the EPA's Indian Policy and Tribal
Amendments to Federal Environmental Laws, Paper Presented at Fourth Annual Natural
Resources Management and Environmental Enforcement on Indian Lands, Albuquerque,
N.M., at 7-1, 7-2 (Feb. 21, 1992) (on File with author) (citing U.S. Dm'T OF THE INTERIoR,
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAiRs, AmEsmcAN INDIANs TODAY - ANSwEns TO YOUR QUESTIONS
9 (1991)).
4. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 101 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (Supp.
11 1990)).
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had the jurisdictional authority to administer air quality protection
programs on tribal lands. After all, the language of the Clean Air Act
(CAA or the Act)' explicitly provided that "[e]ach State shall have
the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State .... ,,6 In 1977, Congress
amended the CAA, authorizing tribes to redesignate their reservations
for air quality purposes.7 However, Congress neglected to address the
issue of who would be vested with the authority to enforce such air
quality standards.
In 1990, Congress broke its silence with regard to environmental
regulation on tribal lands and again amended the CAA.8 Congress
sought to improve air quality on Indian lands "in a manner consistent
with the EPA Indian Policy[9] and the 'overall Federal position in
support of Tribal self-government and the government-to-government
relations between Federal and Tribal governments." ' 10 The Act's
amendment constitutes an "express delegation of power to Indian
tribes to administer and enforce the [CAA] in Indian lands.""
This comment has five sections which provide a brief overview and
history of the implementation and application of the CAA on Indian
lands. Section I traces and discusses the CAA's origin and its progeny,
beginning with its silent, then explicit, treatment of tribal nations.
Section II discusses the recent legislative developments regarding treat-
ment of tribes as states in the CAA. Environmental jurisdiction on
tribal lands, including "checkerboard" land, is addressed in section
III. This section reviews the importance of tribal self-determination
and self-government as they relate to the environmental aspects of the
tribal land base and discusses the relationship between tribes and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Next, section IV evaluates the applicability of the CAA to tribal
lands in Oldahoma, including the State's argument for its own assertion
of environmental regulatory authority on tribal lands. Finally, section
V concludes with the author's view that although tribes and states
have legitimate interests in effective control of Indian reservation
pollution sources, tribes are the entities better situated to regulate the
tribal environment.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (Supp. II
1990).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1988).
7. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988)).
8. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (Supp. I 1990)).
9. Oi "cr, oF EPA ADM'R, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADmINIrRATION OF ENVMONZMENTAL
PR OGRAms ON INDIAN RESERVATioNS (1984) [hereinafter EPA INDIAN POLICY].
10. S. RE'. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]




L The Clean Air Act: Regulatory Limbo
The first version of the CAA was passed by Congress in 1963.12 The
CAA authorized federal authorities to expand their research efforts,"
empowering them to make grants to state air pollution control agencies
and in limited circumstances to directly intervene to abate interstate
pollution.14 In 1965, amendments to the CAA 5 resulted in federal
authority to control motor vehicle emissions.1
6
The focus, however, shifted somewhat in the Air Quality Act of
1967 (the 1967 Act). 17 When Congress realized the substantial threat
posed by stationary sources of air pollution, it sought to regulate those
point sources. Although the new version reiterated the earlier Act's
premise that primary responsibility for the prevention and control of
air pollution at its source remain with the states and local governments,
the federal government's role was increased by according federal au-
thorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement.' 8 Still, the
states normally determined what air quality standards they would meet
and the period of time in which they would do so. 9
By 1970, states had made little progress in reaching the prescribed
federal air quality standards. Congress reacted to the states' inadequate
planning and non-implementation of the 1967 Act by amending the
CAA again in 1970.20 The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (the 1970
Amendments) 21 increased the federal authority and responsibility to
decrease air pollution, although these amendments explicitly reserved
to the states the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within
the state.22 However, the 1970 Amendments no longer gave states the
12. Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)).
13. In the mid-1950s Congress began looking at the issue of air pollution; in 1955,
Congress authorized the Surgeon General to study air pollution. See Air Pollution Control
Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-145, 69 Stat. 322. In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon
General to focus his attention on health hazards caused by motor vehicle emissions. RoGma
W. FmDI.EY & DANirL A. FAREm, ENviRoNmENTAL LAW 292 (3rd ed. 1991).
14. FiNDLEY & FAaBE, supra note 13, at 292.
15. Act of Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
16. Id. The amendments required that later models of cars have catalytic converters
and that states have automobile emission standards.
17. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-
1871 (1988)).
18. FiNDanv & FARa, supra note 13, at 293-94.
19. Id. at 293.
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b-
1857h (1988)).
22. 1970 Amendments § 110, 84 Stat. at 1680 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
7410 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
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option of how and when they would comply with the CAA. Instead,
the law required states to attain particular air quality standards spec-
ified by the EPA within a specified period of time.Y
The concept of the CAA is national in scope; its goal is that all
"ambient"' u air be clean. The 1970 Amendments directed the EPA to
formulate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs)2 to protect
the public from targeted air pollutants.2 The restructured Act incor-
porated the idea of "attainment." An attainment area is a designated
area which has attained specific emission standards, i.e., NAAQSs,
for a designated pollutant. 27 The attainment concept is the basic prin-
ciple governing state implementation plans (SIPs).u
Congress directed the EPA to publish proposed regulations describ-
ing NAAQSs.29 There was then a period of ninety days provided for
comments on the proposed standards. After this period, the EPA was
required to promulgate its proposed standards through regulations. 0
The standards were of two types: "primary" standards, based on
criteria allowing an "adequate margin of safety.., to protect public
health,"'" and "secondary" standards, aimed at protecting the "public
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence of such air pollutants in the ambient air.''32
Within nine months of the enactment of the EPA's minimum re-
quirements, states were directed to submit to the EPA their own plans
aimed at implementing and maintaining such standards within their
boundaries. 33 Such a plan is referred to as a state implementation plan,
i.e., a SIP. The EPA would then approve or disapprove a state's plan.
The EPA is directed to approve any state plan that will attain the
standards set in NAAQSs.3 4 If a state plan failed to meet federally
23. FrDLEY & FARBER, supra note 13, at 292; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990).
24. "Ambient" is the statute's term for the outdoor air used by the general public.
FmDiEY & FanaRn, supra note 13, at 293.
25. The NAAQSs are air emission standards deemed acceptable by Congress. See 42
U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
26. Id. §§ 7408-7409.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
28. A SIP is a strategy developed by a state to demonstrate how it intends to attain
the NAQQSs in its nonattainment (polluted) area(s). See infra note 63 and text accom-
panying notes 33-34.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1988).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
32. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
33. Id. § 7410(a)(1). The deadline was extended from nine months to "within 3 years
(or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe). . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)
(Supp. 11 1990).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Such approval is contingent upon
the proposed SIP meeting the federally mandated minimum criteria established and outlined
in 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Id.
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mandated requirements, the federal government would implement its
own plan for the state.
Unfortunately, this process proved to be more difficult than antic-
ipated. The CAA is premised on a per-specific-pollutant basis for
regulation purposes. In other words, "each air pollutant" must be
identified; then the EPA makes a determination of how much pollutant
a company or business may or may not emit. The CAA is a technology-
forcing statute, which means if a polluter does not have the technology
or equipment to meet the EPA's "adequate margin of safety" (the
primary standard) when emitting pollutants, then the EPA can order
an entity to cease its operations. This in effect forces an entity to
purchase or create technology which would allow it to operate in a
manner that complies with the federally mandated standards.
In 1971, the EPA identified and set standards for the regulation of
only six pollutants. Congress has further mandated the EPA to regulate
nearly 200 additional pollutants.3 5 The EPA, however, was limited by
insufficient information regarding scientific uncertainties about the
health effects.36 Moreover, Congress charged the EPA with designing
feasible plans of controlling air pollution without eliminating economic
growth. 37 The deadlines set by the 1970 Amendments proved unattain-
able. Congress responded by extending the deadlines to govern areas
of the country not meeting the standards (nonattainment areas) and
by passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (the 1977 Amend-
ments).3 While extending the deadlines for attaining air quality stan-
dards, Congress added new provisions designed to prevent significant
deterioration (PSD requirements) of air quality in areas already having
clean air.
The CAA provides that areas of land, with regard to the air quality
standards, are to be designated into one of three classes. 39 The PSD
requirement is contingent upon the particular classification of air. A
class I designation is the most stringent of the three classifications.
Class I protects pristine air quality and permits very little deterioration
of air quality. Class II permits some air quality deterioration, and
class III tolerates even more deterioration, although air quality may
not fall below national standards in any class. 40
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (Supp. I 1990).
36. FINDLEY & F ABER, supra note 13, at 294.
37. Id.
38. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7626 (1988)). Congress continues to extend the attainment deadline for nonattainment
areas. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. 11 1990).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990). Until the 1977 Amendments, the Act was silent as to who (tribes or states)
would have authority to designate air quality standards for areas within reservation
boundaries.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (1988).
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Prior to 1977, no provision of the CAA delegated any authority to
Indians. 41 In fact, none of the provisions specifically included or
addressed Indian land or tribes. 42 The 1977 Amendments authorized
tribes to redesignate their reservations for air quality purposes. 43 The
amendments, however, were silent as to what role tribal governments
would play in enforcing such regulations.
II. Recent Legislative Developments: Tribes as Regulators
Federal environmental regulatory laws generally require nationally
uniform application. The 1977 Amendments provided Indian tribes
with the authority to redesignate air quality classifications on Indian
land, 44 giving tribes the authority to upgrade their lands from a class
II designation, which permits some deterioration of air quality, to the
most stringent class I designation, which permits almost no deterio-
ration of pristine air quality. However, Congress failed to address
what role tribal governments would play in air quality planning or
enforcing air quality programs on tribal lands.
The Senate report on the 1990 Amendments explains that amendment
is "necessary to ensure that tribes will be allowed to participate fully
in programs established by the Act as they take affirmative measures
to manage, regulate, and protect air quality. '45 The report further
explicates that the 1990 Amendments are intended to provide Indian
tribes the same opportunity to assume primary planning, implemen-
tation, and enforcement responsibilities for CAA programs that they
41. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)).
42. The CAA applies to "owner[s] or operator[s]." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(5) (1988).
The Act provides that "[t]he term 'owner or operator' means any person who owns,
leases, operates, controls, or supervises a stationary, source." Id. At one time, there was
concern as to whether the CAA would apply to Indian lands since the Act did not
specifically include Indian tribes. See Jana L. Walker & B. Kevin Gover, Tribal Civil
Regulatory Jurisdiction to Enforce Environmental Laws (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author). The 1990 Amendments allay this concern by specifically addressing the effects
of the CAA on tribal governments and what role tribes may play in enforcing the Act's
provisions.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1988); see also Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454. U.S. 1081 (1981) (holding that tribes were subject to the provisions of the
CAA and authorizing tribes to redesignate their reservation lands with different air quality
standards). While Nance was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Congress
amended the CAA, expressly permitting tribal governments to redesignate air quality
standards on reservation lands. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
95, § 164(c), 91 Stat. 685, 733 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (1988 & Supp.
11 1990)).




have been accorded under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)46 and
the Clean Water Act (CWA).47 Under the SDWA and CWA, Indian
tribes were delegated the power to administer and enforce the respective
programs.
48
A. Tribal Implementation Plans
As mentioned previously in section I, the CAA requires states to
submit their SIPs to the EPA for approval or disapproval. 49 If a state
satisfies the statutory requirements, 50 the EPA must approve its plan.51
Until the 1990 Amendments were passed, the CAA was silent in
regard to tribal implementation plans (TIPs). Presently, if a tribe
submits a TIP to the EPA Administrator, the EPA shall review the
plan in accordance with the provisions for review set forth for state
plans.5 2 However, TIPs are subject not only to state standards of
review but also to further statutory requirements as the EPA Admin-
istrator deems appropriate.53
The 1990 Amendments direct that the EPA Administrator "may
promulgate regulations which establish the elements of tribal imple-
mentation plans and procedures for approval or disapproval. ' 54 This
allows the EPA Administrator to use broad discretion in determining
what criteria TIPs must satisfy before tribes may implement their air
quality control plans. The latest word is from the 'former EPA Ad-
ministrator William K. Reilly, who stated the EPA's position as one
which encourages tribal management of environmental programs, thus
formalizing the EPA's role in strengthening tribal management of
46. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (1988 & Supp. 111990). The tribal
amendments authorize the EPA to treat Indian tribes as states and to delegate to tribes
the primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems and underground injection
control.
47. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. II
1990) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act); see also SENATE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 79.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-ll (1988); id. § 1377.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
50. Requirements for state implementation plans for national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards are found at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (Supp. 11 1990).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(3) (Supp. 11 1990). This section of the statute reserves much
administrative authority to the EPA Administrator. It empowers the Administrator to
promulgate regulations (distinct from SIPs) which establish the elements of TIPs and
procedures for approval or disapproval of TIPs. The Act lays out further the foundational
requirements for treating tribes as states. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(3) (Supp. 11 1990).
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reservation environments. 5.
B. Tribes As States
Current congressional and executive policies favor tribal self-deter-
mination. 56 Accordingly, the EPA policies reflect, in the environmental
arena, this commitment to tribal self-government.
The 1990 Amendments direct the EPA to treat Indian tribes as
states. 57 The amendments provide that such treatment shall be granted
only if an Indian tribe has a governing body" with the power to carry
out substantial governmental duties, governing tribal functions per-
taning to air resource protection and management within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation, and is reasonably "capable" of com-
plying with the purposes and regulations of the CAA.59 The amend-
ments further require that a tribe be federally recognized. 60
"Capable" is a key word in the Act's provision. 61 To be reasonably
"capable" means that a tribe has demonstrated both an economic and
a technical ability to administer air quality protection programs. 62 Once
the tribe's economic ability is demonstrated, the EPA will focus on
its technical ability. 63 In finding economic ability, the EPA considers
funds that are available to tribes on a regular basis, a tribe's own
financial condition or its ability to raise money. Such funds are
necessary to provide a payroll for employees to operate and maintain
a TIP. Once these threshold requirements are satisfied, a tribe will be
55. Memorandum from William K. Reilly, EPA Administrator, to Assistant Admin-
istrators, General Counsel, Inspector General, Regional Administrators, Associate Admin-
istrators, and Staff Office Directors (July 10, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reilly
Memorandum of July 10, 1991].
56. Telephone Interview with Mark Chandler, Director of Indian Affairs, EPA Region
6C (Mar. 5, 1993). According to Chandler, his and other EPA offices have received
notification that President Clinton intends to encourage and promote tribal self-determi-
nation. Id. It is interesting to note that while congressional and executive policies favor
tribal sovereignty, judicial decisions are having the oprlosite effect. See infra cases and
text accompanying notes 131-70.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (Supp. 11 1990).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 111990). The tribe must be federally recognized.
SmNAT REPOaT, supra note 10, at 78-79.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B), (C) (Supp. 11 1990).
60. Id. § 7602(r). This section defines "Indian tribe" as "any Indian tribe, band,
nation or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village, which
is federally recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." Id.
61. Telephone Interview with Mark Chandler, Director of Indian Affairs, EPA Region
6C (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Chandler Interview of Nov. 18, 1991].
62. Id.
63. Id. This comment does not explicate in detail projected technological requirements.
Such requirements would inherently be limited by and dependent upon economic capabilities
and further adapted to a particular operator's business and its polluting activities.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/5
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eligible to obtain regulatory authority, along with the obligation of
enforcing environmental regulations. However, the grant of environ-
mental regulatory and enforcement authority is further subject to the
EPA Administrator's discretion."
One reason for requiring a tribe to exhibit economic capability is
that the ability to compensate personnel to operate, maintain, and
enforce environmental regulations better ensures that the objectives of
environmental laws - protecting and enhancing human health and
environmental integrity - will be achieved. If the EPA patterns tribal
"capability" after criteria that states must incorporate in SIPs, the
"capability" threshold would require a demonstrated ability that tribes
have adequate funding, personnel, and authority under tribal laws to
carry out an implementation plan.
6
1
To supplement the "adequate funding" prerequisite, tribes must
request "set aside" funds from the EPA just as they must request
funds from the Justice Department for tribal police." The 1990 Amend-
ments authorize the EPA to provide tribes grant and contract assis-
tance. 67 Because "set asides" are not granted on an annual basis to
every tribe, and because there are more tribes than there are adequate
"set aside" funds, preference would probably be given to a tribe that
has already demonstrated its economic ability.68
Tribes lacking sufficient tribal or federal funds to develop an eco-
nomic infrastructure might require potential project developers to fund
various anticipated TIP costs, which could include costs associated
with developing of an air quality code for owners and operators, air
quality regulations, construction and operating permits (especially if a
new facility is involved). To further facilitate development of an
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (Supp. 11 1990).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The Act provides that each
SIP shall
require the owner or operator of each major stationary source to pay to the
permitting authority [the Tribe in this instance] ... a fee sufficient to
cover.. .(i) the reasonable costs of reviewing and acting upon any application
for such a permit, and ... (ii) if the owner or operator receives a permit
for such source, the reasonable costs of implementing and enforcing the
terms and conditions of any such permit (not including any court costs or
other cost associated with any enforcement action...
Id. § 7410(a)(2)(L).
66. Chandler Interview of Nov. 18, 1991, supra note 61.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(C)(5) (Supp. 11 1990).
68. Realizing that tribes are twenty years junior to state environmental programs and
that the implementation of most state programs were supplemented with federal funds,
Congress passed the Indian Environmental Assistance Program Act of 1992. The Act aims
to help tribes formulate and execute environmental programs on tribal lands. See Indian
Environmental General Assistance Program Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-497, 106 Stat.
3258 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4368(b)). See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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economic infrastructure, tribes might assess fees for reviewing permit
applications, including costs for allowing a tribe to hire its own
environmental expert(s) and legal counsel. A permit application might
require that a proposed budget and payroll be included and a guarantee
that a percentage of jobs be held by tribal members. Tribes might
require that potential project developers be willing to help establish
technicad education programs encouraging tribal members to pursue
degrees in the fields of engineering, math, and science, in an attempt
to mitigate tribal reliance on outside technical support. 69
Whatever means are chosen, tribes must look to regulations prom-
ulgated by the EPA Administrator that specify conditions in which it
is appropriate to treat Indian tribes as states for regulatory purposes.70
Congress directed the EPA to publish these regulations by May 15,
1992, eighteen months after the 1990 Amendments.7 ' The EPA is
presently working on these. The proposed regulations will, in effect,
be the mechanics of the Act as they will provide guidance to the tribes
in the formulation of their environmental programs.
C. Economic Incentive Programs
On February 23, 1993, the EPA published proposed rules for eco-
nomic incentive programs (EIPs) for mobile and stationary sources in
nonattainment 2 areas.7 3 The EIP rules are aimed at assisting states
and tribal governments in meeting air quality management goals.7 4
The proposed programs allow for flexible approaches in formulating
less costly control strategies which include providing incentives for the
development and implementation of innovative emissions reductions
technology. 75 The rules for EIPs may be adopted by authorized gov-
erning bodies, "including States, local governments, and Indian gov-
erning bodies (henceforth State)." 7 6
69. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1990). The 1990 Amendments directed the EPA
Administrator to promulgate regulations within 18 months of the November 15, 1990,
effective date of the amendments.
71. Telephone Interview with Mark Chandler, Director of Indian Affairs, EPA Region
6C (Oct. 21, 1991).
72. Areas that have not demonstrated emission reductions sufficient to timely attain
the primary NAAQSs.
73. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,110 (1993). The notice called for comment(s) regarding the
proposed rules and posted a date for a public hearing.
74. The proposed programs allow for flexible approaches in formulating less costly
control strategies which include providing incentives for the development and implemen-
tation of innovative emissions reductions technology.
75. Id.
76. Id. "Indian governing body" is defined as a "governing body of any tribe, band,
or group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and recognized by the U.S. as
possessing power of self-government." Id. at 11,126.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/5
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These proposed regulations identify key provisions which must be
included in the formulation of environmental programs. 7 Tribes must
look to the EPA's specified criteria for guidance when formulating
environmental programs.
III. Environmental Jurisdiction on Tribal Lands
When the issue of controlling pollution on Indian land arises, tribal
governments and individual states assert governing interests. Tribal
governments insist they should determine the future quality of reser-
vation environments while states claim their right to regulate environ-
mental programs on reservations located in the state or at least the
non-Indians who live or conduct business within reservation bounda-
ries.7 8 Both tribes and states claim a vital interest in ensuring that
reservation pollution sources are regulated properly and managed;
however, they differ on what means to employ in doing so.7
9
The former EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly, prepared and
circulated a memorandum formalizing the EPA's role in strengthening
tribal governments' management of environmental programs on reser-
vations. 0 While the EPA recognizes that both tribes and states have an
interest in controlling and regulating pollution sources on Indian lands,
the EPA encourages tribal management of environmental programs on
tribal lands. 8 The EPA situates itself in a position consistent with and
complementary to the framework of federal Indian policy goals
8 2
77. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,110 (1993). The following elements will generally be included in
program designs: clearly defined purpose and goal(s), rationally related incentive mechanism
to accomplish the goals, clearly defined scope identifying affected sources, and assurances
that the program will not interfere with any other requirements of the CAA. Id.
78. Reilly Memorandum of July 10, 1991, supra note 55, at 1-2.
79. Id.
80. Memorandum from William K. Reilly, EPA Administrator, to Assistant Admin-
istrators, Associate Administrators, Regional Administrators, General Counsel and In-
spector Counsel (Feb. 7, 1990) (on file with author).
81. Id. at 2.
82. The EPA's Indian policy is premised on tribal self-determination, as set forth by
former Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, and now President Clinton, as federal policy.
See generally EPA IrrDsk Poucy, supra note 9. The referenced document sets forth the
principles guiding the EPA in dealing with tribal governments and environmental man-
agement on Indian reservations. It provides, in pertinent part, that the EPA will do the
following: work with tribal governments on a one-to-one ("government-to-government")
basis recognizing tribal governments as the primary parties in establishing environmental
policies, programs, and standards for reservations; affirmatively encourage and assist tribes
in assuming regulatory and environmental program management responsibilities for res-
ervation lands; consider tribal interests and concerns whenever EPA actions or decisions
"may affect reservations environments"; and incorporate Indian policy goals into its
planning and management activities, which include its budget and regulation development
processes. Id.
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and federal Indian law. 3 The EPA further maintains that "[tiribal
governments are the appropriate non-federal party for making decisions
and carrying out Lprogram responsibilities affecting Indian reservations,
their environments, and the health and welfare of the reservation pop-
ulace."
8 4
Consistent with Indian policy, the EPA's 1991 appropriations provided
then-Administrator William K. Reilly with authority "to make grants
to '[flederally recognized Indian tribes' . . . for the development of
multimedia environmental programs."" Federally recognized Indian tribes
and consortia are eligible to receive multimedia assistance agreements.86
The grants assist tribes in developing environmental program infrastruc-
tures, environmental codes, and the capacity to perform inspections,
monitoring, planning, assessment, and corrective actions.Y
A. Tribal Authority
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress expressly recognized the role of
tribal governments. Clearly, tribal governments may act lawfully under
their police power to protect the health and welfare of the reservation
population."8 The authority to regulate pollution programs on tribal
lands provides a means by which Indian tribes may exercise their own
governmental powers and thus strengthen the fabric of tribal govern-
ment.89 This notion clearly corresponds with the federal Indian policy
83. Reilly Memorandum of July 10, 1991, supra note 55, at 3. In determining
jurisdictional matters over reservation pollution sources, the EPA will apply applicable
treaties, statutes, federal Indian law, and federal law as found in the U.S. Constitution.
Id.
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (Supp. I 1990); see also Kathy Biggs, Multimedia Assistance
Agreements for Indian Tribes, U.S. EPA NA'nv AEmRucA- Naiwou, Summer/Fall 1991,
at 4. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (Supp. 11 1990).
86. Indian Environmental General Assistance Program Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-497, § 502, 106 Stat. 3258, 3259-60.
87. Id. The bill provides for tribes and tribal consortia through grants enabling tribes
to plan, develop, and establish the capability to implement environmental programs on
Indian lands. 106 Stat. at 3259. The EPA Administrator has been directed to promulgate
the application procedures to receive the grants for tribal governments or intertribal
consortium. Id.
88. Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous
Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENm. L. Ray. 449, 453 (1989). Congress
expressly has recognized tribal governmental roles under three laws that EPA administers:
(1) Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988); (2)
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (1988) (commonly referred to
as the Clean Water Act); and (3) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1988).
89. Du Bey et al., supra note 88, at 453.
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statement published by then-President Ronald Reagan on January 24,
1983.9 The federal Indian policy statement supports: the primary role
of tribal governments in matters affecting American Indian reservations,
the EPA's general policy statements9' recognizing the importance of
tribal governments in matters affecting American Indian reservations,
and Congress' express consent to EPA-administered management pro-
grams recognizing tribal governments as the independent authority for
reservation affairs.
In most instances, inherent tribal sovereignty sufficiently supports
tribal exercises of regulatory authority. 92 Sovereignty generally protects
tribal self-government or the control mechanisms of internal relations.9 3
For example, tribes retain inherent power to determine tribal member-
ship, punish tribal offenders, and regulate domestic relations among
members.Y Regarding the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with a tribe or its members, through contracts, commercial
dealings, leases, or other arrangements, tribes remain sovereign in de-
ciding whether to regulate through taxation, licensing, or other means. 9
When the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within a reservation
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of [a] tribe," the tribe retains
inherent power to exercise civil authority over such conduct.9 Only in
90. President's Indian Policy Statement, 19 WEmKLY Comp. Pps. Doc. 98 (Jan. 28,
1983). President Nixon, as early as 1970, promoted a policy of Indian self-determination.
The policy recognized the unique relationship between the federal government and tribal
governments, which further acknowledged the government's trust responsibility in enabling
Indians to maintain their cultural, social, and political identities as they adopted systems
to improve their social and economic well being. Indian Affairs: The President's Message
to the Congress, 6 WEEKLY CoMp. PREs. Doc. 894 (July 8, 1970).
91. EPA INDIAi Poucy, supra note 9. In 1980 the EPA already had developed an
Indian policy that emphasized tribal self-determination and the need for tribal roles in
environmental programs; however, the major thrust of support did not come until 1983.
Du Bey, et al., supra note 88, at 451 n.l.
92. Du Bey et al., supra note 88, at 596.
93. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 409 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980). Self-
government has been described by the United States Supreme Court as the highest and
best use of all among the arts of civilized life. According to Justice Matthews, self-
government for Indians includes "the regulation by themselves of their own domestic
affairs, [and] the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the
administration of their own laws and customs." Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568
(1883).
94. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565 (holding that a tribe has no authority
to regulate hunting and fishing activities of non-tribal members on fee lands within the
reservation).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 565-66.
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circumstances where such sovereignty has been divested is specific del-
egation necessary." Nothing, however, can prevent the federal govern-
ment from granting or delegating its authority to native governments
because the federal government derives its power from the United States
Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power "[tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes."
9 8
B. Relations Between Tribal Governments and the EPA
Congress amended the CAA in 1990 with the idea of supporting tribal
self-government." In doing so, Congress expressly delegated to tribal
governments the administrative and enforcement power of regulating
ambient air quality and standards on tribal lands.' ® However, this
delegation of regulatory power to tribes is conditional. Tribes must
satisfy specific requirements and jump through the proper administrative
hoops before they will be granted tribes-as-states authority in regulating
and enforcing the CAA upon their own lands.
A tribe first must seek an agency determination that it has a governing
body carrying out substantial duties and powers, that the functions to
be exercised by the tribe pertain to the management and protection of
air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, and that
it is reasonably "capable" of carrying out regulatory functions consistent
with the CAA. The EPA Administrator's finding of tribal "capability"1 0'
is the condition precedent for allowing a tribe to implement its air
quality programs.
The overall policy of the EPA is to treat tribes as states whenever
possible where tribes exercise their prerogative to develop and implement
environmental programs. Active tribal participation in environmental
protection programs will enable tribal members to develop technical and
administrative expertise complementary to the current policy of tribal
self-government. °2
C. Tribal Role in the Protection and Regulation of the Reservation
Environment
Tribal programs provide tribes with the means to mitigate adverse
environmental impacts associated with any proposed economic devel-
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
99. SNATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 79.
100. Id.
101. See discussion infra part 1I(B).
102. Du Bey et al., supra note 88, at 471.
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opment on tribal land.03 Tribal programs would encourage economic
development, while ensuring that a proposed project could be consistent
with the tribal goal of maintaining a healthful local and global environ-
ment.104 It is at the local level, the Indian reservation, where the most
concerned and informed unitary management would take place, because
local governing would be more responsive to individual tribal needs.
Furthermore, governing at the tribal level is potentially more hospitable
to unique tribal situations and solutions, and takes more fully into
account tribal interests. It is the most logical level to situate management
when determining the environmental needs of the tribal community.
More informed tribal input into tribal air regulatory programs would
better facilitate compliance with such programs and better carry out the
intentions and purpose of the CAA.
D. Determining Jurisdiction Over Pollution Sources Within the
Exterior Boundaries of a Reservation
Before determining which government - federal, tribal, or state -
should enforce the laws within Indian country, these entities must
delineate the scope of tribal jurisdiction. The EPA authorization of
management over the reservation environment will be granted only where
a tribal or state government can demonstrate adequate jurisdiction over
pollution sources throughout the reservation. 05 While tribes may exercise
the power to enforce tribal laws against tribal members, 16 it is uncertain
whether this power extends to non-tribal members on Indian lands.
Many reservations exhibit mixed tribal member and non-tribal member
residency and ownership patterns. Mixed ownership patterns on Indian
lands is the result of inconsistent federal Indian policies, which called
for the alienation of reservation lands. 17
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act,10 which resulted
in non-Indian ownership of land within the reservation boundaries.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Reilly Memorandum of July 10, 1991, supra note 55, at 3.
106. Ex parte Crowe Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883).
107. Faux S. COHEN's HANDBooK OF FEDERAL IDniAN LAW 127-38, 471-99, 612-21
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter CoHEN]. The types of land ownership
within reservations include: land held in trust by the federal government for the tribe or
individual tribal member; land owned in fee by a tribe or individual tribal member; and,
land owned in fee by a non-tribal member which includes non-Indians. Mickale Carter,
Regulatory Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations in Montana, 5 Put. LAMN L. Ray. 147,
155 (1984).
108. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 1162, 24 Stat. 388, 389-91 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)) (also known as the Dawes Act).
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Pursuant to the Act, the government divided land within reservation
boundaries into small plots; ownership was allotted to individual tribal
members. After twenty-five years, fee simple title vested in the individual
tribal member. 109 As a result of this policy, the land Indians lost or
sold was no longer held under trust status."10 The Act reflected the
federal government's policy of eliminating and assimilating tribal lands.
The Act was intended to assimilate Indians into "civilization" and
consequently destroy tribal communities. The result of this policy was
a decline in the total amount of Indian land ownership from 138 million
acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in 1934."'
The passage in 1934 of the Indian Reorganization Act"2 ended the
policy of allotment and placed all of the unsold surplus land in trust
for the benefit of the tribe."' The Act extended trust status indefinitely
to trust lands within the reservation." 4
By the 1930s, allotment ceased, but the General Allotment Act's
legacy remains. Reservations are now characterized by a "checkerboard"
pattern of ownership. The federal government holds land in trust as a
whole for the tribe or for an individual member. The land may also be
owned by either tribal members or non-tribal members in "fee" title.'"
Congress has plenary authority to regulate Indian lands. The Com-
merce Clause confers authority on Congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." 6
In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280,"1 which created a method
allowing states to assume unilateral civil and criminal jurisdiction over
activities on reservations. However, the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act"'
curtailed this practice by allowing state assumption of jurisdiction only
where a majority vote of enrolled tribal members consented to such
adjudicatory jurisdiction."19 Thus, states may assume concurrent juris-
diction over reservations only with tribal consent.
109. Carter, supra note 107, at 155.
110. I.
111. IM. (citing CoHEN, supra note 107, at 138).
112. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988 & Supp. II. 1990)) (also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act).
113. Carter, supra note 107, at 154.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
117. 1.3 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988). In Pub. L. No. 280, Congress granted six states (Alaska,
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin) civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian reservations within the state's boundaries. Other states were given the option
to acquire similar jurisdiction.
118. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
119. Carter, supra note 107, at 157.
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E. Checkerboard Jurisdiction: Transboundary Problems Arising from
Inconsistent Standards and Enforcement Activities
International Paper Co. v. Oullette'20 demonstrated the United States
Supreme Court's unwillingness to allow a state to extend unilaterally its
environmental standards within the external boundaries of a neighboring
state.' 2' In Oullette, the defendant operated a pulp and paper mill on
the New York side of Lake Champlain. The defendant's discharge pipe
ran from the mill through the water toward Vermont, ending just before
the state line that divides the lake. The plaintiffs filed suit seeking
compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction requiring the
defendant to restructure part of its water treatment system. Holding
that Vermont nuisance law was preempted by the Clean Water Act
(CWA),I2 the Supreme Court concluded that the CWA precludes a
court from applying the law of an affected state, such as a downstream
state, against an out-of-state source.'2 The Court reasoned that if such
actions were permitted, liabilities would attach even though the source
had complied fully with its state and federal permit obligations. 24 The
Court further reasoned that such a decision would "allow Vermont to
do indirectly what [it] could not do directly - regulate the conduct of
out-of-state sources." '1
When a comprehensive federal program such as the CAA expressly
directs that tribes be treated as states, the Indian Commerce Clause
serves as a barrier to state regulation of the reservation environment,
just as the Commerce Clause disallows one state to extend its jurisdiction
over a neighboring state. 26 The Indian Commerce Clause analysis, not
the traditional interstate commerce clause analysis, is to be applied when
state action seeks to limit tribal activity. 27 The Supreme Court has stated
that the Indian Commerce Clause serves as a shield, protecting Indian
tribes from state and local interference.'2 Through this power, the
120. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
121. Id. at 489; see also Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub
nom. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (holding a state's downstream direct
participation in deciding whether the EPA can grant a permit is limited; however, the
EPA is afforded deference and may consider or require a point source (upstream state)
to comply with a downstream state's water quality standards).
122. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp.
I 1990) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act). The CWA is a pollution control
strategy which focuses on the pollution sources and attempts to determine the proper level
of pollution those sources may discharge (effluent). This strategy applies to varying
categories of pollution sources (i.e., paper mills, water treatment facilities, chemical plants).
123. Ouelette, 479 U.S. at 490-91.
124. Id. at 494.
125. Id.
126. Du Bey et al., supra note 88, at 466-67 n.81.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1982)).
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federal government and its agencies can preempt state intrusion into
federal and tribal environmental regulatory programs on Indian reser-
vations. 29
Native American nations assert regulatory authority over non-Indians
both on Indian-owned land and on land patented in fee to non-tribal
members in Indian country. 30 In Montana v. United States,' the Court
held that a tribe may retain inherent powers to exercise civil jurisdiction
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the tribe's political
integrity, economic security, or health and welfare.3 2
In Montana, the Crow Tribe claimed jurisdiction to regulate non-
Indian fishing and hunting on non-Indian land. Ruling that the Tribe
lacked this jurisdiction, the Court held that the Tribe had lost its
regulatory interest because the Tribe had acquiesced to the State's
regulation of such activities.' The Court stressed that the "exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status
of tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delega-
tion."' 34 The Montana Court did note that there are situations in which
a tribe may regulate non-tribal members: if non-tribal members live on
native owned land, tribal authority is exclusive of state action, at least
where state interests are not implicated.33 Additionally, a tribe may
retain regulatory control over non-tribal members if their activity
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."'36
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, ' 7 the Court addressed the issue of "checkerboard" jurisdiction.
The Brendale Court held that "unless an express congressional delegation
of tribal power to the contrary" exists, tribes do not have regulatory
power over "open" lands held in fee by non-Indians.'
In Brendale, the Tribe's zoning ordinance applied to all lands within
the reservation owned by Indians or non-Indians, while the county's
zoning ordinance applied to all lands within its borders except land held
in trust. About eighty percent of the reservation land was held in trust
by the United States for the Tribe or its individual members, and the
129. Du Bey et al., supra note 88, at 466-67 n.81.
130. Royster & Fausett, supra note 2, at 597.
131. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
132. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566.
133. IAl.
134. Id. at 564.
135. Id. at 566.
136. Id. at 565-66.
137. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
138. I. at 410.
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remaining twenty percent was owned in fee by Indian or non-Indian
owners.3 9 Most of the fee land was located in three towns but the
remainder was scattered throughout the rest of the reservation in a
"checkerboard" pattern. The reservation has been divided into two
parts: "open area," which is land open to the general public, and
"closed area," which is land restricted or closed to the general public.
The Yakima County Planning Department issued zoning permits to
Brendale and Wilkinson, owners of fee land in the closed and open
areas respectively. The county permits authorized land development in
ways not permitted by the Tribe's ordinance. The Indian tribe sought
declaratory relief and injunctions upholding its right to impose its zoning
and land-use laws on fee land owned by non-Indians within the reser-
vation.
The Brendale Court held the County was entitled to exercise zoning
power over fee land within the reservation's "open area," provided that
the zoning ordinance would have no "demonstrably serious impact" on
the Tribe and would not threaten the Tribe's political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare. 140 The Court reasoned that tribal sov-
ereignty "extends only to what is necessary to protect tribal self-gov-
ernment and is divested to the extent it is inconsistent with a tribe's
dependent status" absent an "express congressional delegation of tribal
power to the contrary."'
14
Applying Brendale to the issue of whether tribes can enforce air
quality programs over "checkerboard" land, 4 2 a court would be com-
pelled to find that Congress' express delegation to tribes under the CAA,
coupled with relevant case law, 143 is rather persuasive in upholding a
tribe's assertion of civil-regulatory jurisdiction. Furthermore, allowing
states to apply their regulatory laws to Indian reservations would inter-
fere with the policies and goals underlying federal laws relating to Indians
along with presidential and the EPA policies. It would allow states to
do indirectly what they cannot do directly - regulate and impede tribal
sovereignty.
F. Diminishing Emphasis on Tribal Sovereignty
Historian D'Arcy McNickle has summed up this sovereignty and
regulatory morass:
139. Id. at 415. This percentage is a breakdown of the approximately 1.3 million acres
of reservation land.
140. Id. at 409-10. Almost one-half of the land in the "open area" was fee land. Id.
at 415.
141. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 409.
142. This term encompasses reservation land owned in fee by Indians or non-Indians.
143. See cases discussed in text accompanying infra notes 149-76.
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This is not an Indian problem, as common reference would
like to have it, but a white man's problem. The Indians
knew what they wanted, which was to be left alone within
the boundaries of their ancestral lands. The white man could
not allow that, since he wanted the land for himself. This
left him with the burden of discovering ways in which the
taking of Indian land could be defended as an altruistic act.
The burden has remained with him.'"
Although tribal governments may obtain regulatory authority of the
CAA under the Brendale requirements and the EPA's expert findings,'
45
the Brendale decision conflicts with prior Court decisions upholding
tribal sovereignty. The Brendale decision, in effect, "guarantee[s] that
adjoining reservation lands [will] be subject to inconsistent and poten-
tially incompatible zoning policies, and for all practical purposes [will]
strip tribes of the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over
which they enjoy unquestioned and exclusive authority."' 46
This decision not only conflicts with many of the Court's precedents
and 150 years of federal policy, but it also undermines the federal
government's commitment to the promotion of tribal autonomy. 47 The
Brendale holding, which allowed a state county to impose its zoning
ordinance on fee land owned by non-Indians within the reservation, has
a chilling effect on true tribal self-government; its imposition severs the
"self" from the "government." The Brendale holding exemplifies the
current judicial trend toward decreasing emphasis on tribal self-govern-
ment in favor of state expansionary interests which invade tribal sov-
ereignty. '4
In the 1832 case of Worcester v. Georgia, '49 the Supreme Court held
that Indian nations are considered "distinct independent political com-
munities" and as such the exercise of state jurisdiction on tribal land
is barred. 50 However, this doctrine has been modified by congressional
144. D'ARcY McNicKia, TnrY CAmE HERE FnT: THE EPic OF THE AMEIUCAN INDIAN
279-80 (1975).
145. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Kegulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 131). This is part of the preamble to the Indian Water Quality Standards rule, setting
forth the line of legal reasoning that the EPA will follow when it is required to evaluate
a tribe's assertion of civil regulatory jurisdiction over fee lands within reservation bound-
aries.
146. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 447 (1989).
147. Id. at 447, 461 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. See supra note 94 and infra note 151.
149. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
150. Id. at 559.
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enactments such as Public Law 280 and by court cases which carve out
exceptions to the "absolute bar" to state jurisdiction. 5'
One commentator has noted the "utter confusion" of the Supreme
Court's recent notions of tribal sovereignty in that the Court has been
inconsistent with regard to its "rules" shaping Indian law. 52 The Court
began by ruling that Indian governments retain only those powers not
voluntarily relinquished by Indian governments or expressly taken away
by Congress and ended with the bold rulings that Indian governments
are implicitly divested of all powers other than those necessary to control
tribal internal relations or to protect tribal self-government. Even when
exercising the remaining "powers," a tribe can exercise its sovereignty
only when conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe."3
The Supreme Court's concept of how tribal sovereignty should be
weighed in the preemption balancing process has been changing in ways
that continue to abandon the notion of tribal sovereignty.' 54 This trend
threatens to undermine the current federal policy of establishing gov-
ernment-to-government relationships and encouraging tribal economic
independence and self-government.
In Montana v. United States, 55 the Supreme Court set forth the
principle that the "exercise-of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government" extends only to lands on which a tribe
exercises "undisturbed use and occupation"; furthermore, it cannot
apply to lands subsequently alienated and held in fee by non-Indians
pursuant to the allotment acts.' 56 Thus, tribal members retain only those
151. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that state may regulate surplus water use by non-tribal members on reservation); White
Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129, 1138 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982) (holding that state may enforce fish and game laws against
tribal members on reservation). But see Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that tribal building, health, and safety regulations apply to non-tribal
member owners of grocery stores within the reservations because of consensual commercial
relations and because conduct threatened tribal health).
152. Curtis G. Berkey, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring New Confusion to the
Law of Indian Sovereignty, in RETHDINo Ii',mx, LAw 77, 79 (Nat'l Lawyers Guild
Comm. on Native Am. Struggles ed., 1982) (stating that recent judicial decisions on Native
American sovereignty represent an abandonment of principled decision making).
153. Id.
154. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.8 (1973).
The Court noted that modem cases "tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the
limits of state power." Id. at 172; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324, 334, 341-43 (1983) (holding that state jurisdiction is preempted if it interferes
with federal and tribal interests "unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify"
it).
155. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that tribe has no authority to regulate hunting and
fishing activities of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation).
156. Id. at 557-64.
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powers of self-government that involve relations among tribal mem-
bers. 1" The Montana Court noted that situations may arise where a
tribe may regulate non-tribal members, but those exceptions have been
limited by subsequent decisions."" The Court stated that a tribe may
regulate non-tribal members who enter commercial consensual relations
with a tribe)3 9 In addition, a tribe may retain inherent sovereignty over
non-tribal members if their activity "threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe."'16
In Rice v. Rehner,61 the Supreme Court further curtailed the concept
of tribal sovereignty. In Rice, the Supreme Court focused the preemption
inquiry on the "historical traditions" of tribal sovereignty in the par-
ticular area to be regulated. 62 The Court decided that the preemption
analysis may be accorded less weight to the "backdrop" of tribal
sovereignty if a court finds a governing activity of a tribe to be a
nontraditional tribal activity or if a court determines that the "balance
of state, federal, and tribal interests so requires."'' 6
Rice involved the application of state liquor laws to Indian reservations
to control both tribal and non-tribal members. The petitioner contended
that the freedom to regulate liquor was "important to Indian self-
governance"' 64 and that liquor and its regulation afforded the "internal
and social relations of tribal life."' 6 The Court afforded "little if any
weight to any asserted interest in tribal sovereignty" because the Court
found no history of tribal control in the licensing and distribution of
alcoholic beverages' 66 and because the on-reservation liquor sales would
have substantial "spillover" effects on the state regulatory program
outside the reservation.' 67
As described above, tribal sovereignty no longer inherently bars state
jurisdiction over tribal activity. Under the Supreme Court's recent de-
157. i. at 565.
158. See, e.g., White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982) (holding that state may enforce fish and
game laws against tribal members on reservation); United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d
1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that state may regulate surplus of water use by non-tribal
members on reservation).
159. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565.
160. id. at 565-66; see also United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that state may regulate surplus water use by non-Native Americans on
reservation).
161. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
162. id. at 719-20.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 721.
165. Id. (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
166. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720-25 (1983).
167. Id. at 724.
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cisions, absent clear congressional intent, a court must examine and
balance federal, state, and tribal interests to determine whether the
"exercise of state authority would violate federal law."'' 6 When the
issue of controlling pollution on tribal lands arises, a state may argue
that its ability to coordinate a successful and comprehensive ambient
air quality plan depends at least in part on state control of all emission
activity within its borders. A state would want to exercise jurisdiction
over Native American lands for two reasons: (1) to avoid the bifurcated
patchwork system that would otherwise result if the EPA retained control
over these lands and (2) to maintain a consistently high level of regulation
throughout its borders. States might fear that there would be an incentive
for polluters to locate on reservations if they could avoid a state's more
stringent standards. This is especially true because tribal land is often
isolated and meeting rigorous environmental standards in populated
localities is becoming more difficult.
A state could also argue that on-reservation environmental regulations
would have substantial "spillover" effects on a state's regulatory pro-
gram. However, a state "spillover" argument should fail because the
legislative history of the CAA provides that an Indian tribe may not
assume primary enforcement responsibility for a program under the
CAA in a manner less protective of public health than similar state
programs. 69 Therefore, the courts should be compelled to find that state
interests cannot tip the scale in favor of state regulation and against
tribal sovereignty.
As for arguments regarding tribal traditions of regulating the envi-
ronment, Native American cultures always have had a close and unique
relationship with the physical and natural environment. As a result, the
people, the oceans, the forests, Father Sky, and Mother Earth are
integral components of Indian social, cultural, and spiritual life. Ap-
preciation for the environment is a timeless Native American tradition.
A close study of Native American traditions and their reverence for the
environment will satisfy a Rice test.' 70 Moreover, an essential means by
which Native Americans will maintain the integrity of tribal lands and
self-determination is through environmental regulation.
G. Preemption of State Regulatory Authority on Tribal Lands
States generally lack jurisdiction over Indian lands absent either treaty
language'7' granting jurisdiction to states or other consent by Congress.'
168. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-45 (1981).
169. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 80.
170. See generally Francis E. Ackerman, A Conflict Over Land, 8 Am. INDIaN L.
REv. 259 (1980) (discussing Native American concepts of land use and ownership and how
such concepts are linked to social, cultural, and spiritual significance); Rennard Strickland,
"The Ideal of Environment and the Ideal of the Indian," 10 J. AM. IrDJA EDUC. 8
(1970) (same).
171. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1963).
172. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987). The
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A major doctrine in Indian law is that state jurisdiction cannot be
inferred over Indian lands; it must be granted specifically.'
"Indian country" encompasses more territory than the term "reser-
vation," which generally refers to land reserved by treat, statute, or
executive order. "Indian country" encompasses land within reservations,
dependent Indian communities within United States' borders, and all
Indian allotments.' 74
In United States v. John,'75 the Court held that trust status created
a "reservation" and that the test for determining Indian country status
does not turn on whether the land is "trust land" or a "reservation";
rather, the test is whether the area has been "validly set apart for the
use of ][ndians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.' ' 76
H. Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Tribal Environment
The EPA requires uniform minimum environmental standards
throughout the United States. These minimum standards serve as the
lowest level of environmental quality that tribes must attain or exceed.
The current amendments require that a tribe's regulatory requirements
match a neighboring state's pollution levels. There is nothing in the
CAA that would prevent a tribe from having higher emission levels
exceeding those of other tribes or states.
There seems to be growing arguments in support of concurrent juris-
diction on Indian lands.'7 Under its federal responsibility, 78 the EPA
172. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987). The
only federal statute that grants state regulatory authority over tribes was an act passed in
1947. This mandate gives the Oklahoma Corporation Commission regulatory control over
oil and gas activities on the restricted lands of the "Five Civilized Tribes." Act of Aug.
4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-336, § 11, 61 Stat. 731, 734.
173. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). The term "Indian country" has been defined by Congress
for purposes of federal crimes in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988); it is also generally used in civil
contexts. See Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
175. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
176. Id. at 648-49.
177. State-tribal cooperation has met with success in regulating pesticide application
on reservations. See Leslie Allen, Note, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native
American Lands? Looking Beyond Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14
EcoLoGy. L.Q., 69, 106 n.224 (1987).
178. "[T]he trust relationship is one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law."
COBEN, supra note 107, at 221. See generally id. at 220-28. The concept was first enunciated
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832):
The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is, perhaps,
unlike that of any other two people in existence .... They may, . ..
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations .... They are in a
state of pupilage; their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
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is required to foster tribal sovereignty, where possible, in implementa-
tions of environmental programs.1 7 9 The states are under no such obli-
gation. Although the EPA encourages joint state-tribal program
administration, coerced concurrent jurisdiction, by its very nature, is
unworkable. It has the practical effect of nullifying the efforts of both
sovereigns where the two establish different permissible emission levels.
If a state or tribe refused to negotiate or budge from their respective
sovereign position, it is uncertain as to what remedies either could seek
if each is shielded by sovereign immunity.
Such concurrent jurisdiction would provide the means to set competing
public policies and goals on a collision course should the standards be
adverse to each other. Creation of concurrent jurisdiction would provide
only illusory justice for Indian governments. Deciding whether to enter
into a concurrent jurisdiction agreement with a state is a choice that
should be left to individual tribal governments. If tribes are forced to
enter into such agreements the effect negates tribal self-governance and
determination.
IV. Applicability of EPA Policy in Oklahoma
Oklahoma has more federally recognized tribes within its exterior
borders than any other state in the United States. The agency charged
with regulating air pollution for the State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma
Department of Health (DOH), has expressed its intent to regulate or
continue regulating'" environmental activities within the state's borders,
including those on "Indian lands."' 8'
kindness and its power [and] appeal to it for relief to their wants ....
Id. at 516-17.
Several principles have evolved because of the American Indians' status as "wards of
the nation." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886). First, the plenary power
of Congress over American Indian affairs must be exercised in accordance with the trust
responsibility. That is, Congress must protect generally Native Americans' interests. Second,
when administering Native American affairs, executive agencies also are subject to the
trust responsibility and must act in accordance with strict fiduciary standards. Finally, the
trust responsibility has given rise to canons of construction that treaties and statutes should
be read, where possible, to protect American Indians' rights. As the Supreme Court stated,
"[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
179. See generally Reilly Memorandum of July 10, 1991, supra note 55; EPA INIAN
Poucy, supra note 9.
180. Telephone Interview with Barbara Rausch, Counsel for Okla. Dep't of Health
(Nov. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Rausch Interview]. This assumption is based partly on the
Cherokee Nation's acquiring a permit from DOH to operate a sanitary landfill.
181. Memorandum from George R. Alexander, Jr., EPA Regional Counsel, EPA
Region 6C, to Robert E. Layton, Jr., EPA P.E. Regional Administrator, EPA Region
6A (Aug. 27, 1991) (on file with the author) [hereinafter EPA/Oklahoma Memorandum].
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DOH asserts that there are no reservations in Oklahoma.8 2 DOH
premise,; its position on the fact that when Oklahoma became a state,
it could only do so by terminating all reservations within its bounda-
ries.' To buttress its argument, DOH reasons that, because the EPA
used the term "reservation" rather than "Indian country" in its policy
paper, " the EPA 's policies regarding tribal governments do not apply
in Oklahoma. 85
According to DOH, state law applies to all lands within its borders,
including tribal lands, because there are no reservations. 86 If reservations
do exist in Oklahoma, DOH contends that tribal governments could
not assert regulatory authority over environmental programs because
regulating the environment is not a traditional tribal function. Further-
more, if tribes were granted regulatory power, their environmental plans
would have "spillover" effects on the state's environmental programs
outside of the tribal lands. I 7
A. Oklahoma "'Reservations" v. Oklahoma "Indian Country"
Whether there are reservations in Oklahoma and general doctrines of
Indian law comprise the legal framework to this matter. The EPA
asserts that, absent treaty language or congressional mandate, states
generally lack jurisdiction over Indian lands. 8 Furthermore, the EPA
cannot abdicate its responsibility to states to administer federal environ-
mental statutes in Indian country absent congressional mandate.8 9 There
is no congressional mandate or treaty language which DOH can cite
granting Oklahoma jurisdiction over tribal land' 90 except a 1947 statute,
which gives the Oklahoma Corporation Commission regulatory authority
over oil and gas activities on the restricted lands of the Five Civilized
Tribes.' 9 ' Therefore, the EPA must administer its laws in Indian coun-
try. 9 2
182. Rausch Interview, supra note 180. It is disputed whether the Osage Indians'
mineral rights constitute the last vestige of a "reservation" in Oklahoma.
183. Rausch Interview, supra note 180.
184. EPA INDiAN Policy, supra note 9. See supra note 82.
185. EPA/Oklahoma Memorandum, supra note 181, at 3.
186. Rausch Interview, supra note 180.
187. Id.
188. EPA/Oklahoma Memorandum, supra note 181, at I (citing Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. 202, 207 (1987); CoHEN, supra note 107, at 259-79).
189. EPA/Oklahoma Memorandum, supra note 181, at 4.
190. This does not include any agreements that tribes may have with DOH or Oklahoma
relinquishing tribal jurisdiction.
191. Act of Aug. 4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-336, § 11, 61 Stat. 731, 735.
192. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that underground
injection control program of the Safe Drinking Water Act applies to Indian country);
Blue Legs v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.D. 1987) (holding that the Resource and
Recovery Act applies to Indian country).
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The term "Indian country" simply refers to those lands which Con-
gress intended to reserve for a tribe and over which Congress intended
primary jurisdiction to rest with the federal and tribal governments. 13
In Ahboah v. Housing Authority of the Kiowa Tribe,194 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court recognized the existence of Indian country in'the state. 195
In Ahboah, the Housing Authority of the Kiowa Tribe, a state agency,
brought entry and detainer actions against Indian lessees occupying trust
allotments. The pivotal issue involved who had regulatory jurisdiction
- the state or the tribe. In reaching its decision, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court recognized the existence of Indian country, stating:
The touchstone for allocating authority among the various
governments has been the concept of "Indian country," a
legal term delineating the territorial boundaries of federal,
state and tribal jurisdiction. Historically, the conduct of
Indians and interests in Indian property within Indian country
have been matters of federal and tribal concern. Outside
Indian country, state jurisdiction has obtaned.' 6
In Oklahoma Tax Commission -. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma,197 the Supreme Court concluded that property held
by the federal government in trust for the benefit of Indians is "validly
set apart" and thus qualifies as a reservation for tribal immunity
purposes.' 9' In this case, the Tribe owned and operated a convenience
store on land held in trust for the Tribe by the federal government.
The store never collected Oklahoma's cigarette tax on sales of cigarettes
at the store. Oklahoma assessed the Tribe and demanded back taxes
for cigarette sales. The State contended that the land on which cigarettes
were sold did not fall under the Tribe's sovereign immunity because the
land was not a formally designated reservation.
In reaching its decision, the Court in Potawatomi reiterated the
holding of United States v. John,'99 which stated that the test for
determining Indian country status does not turn on whether the land is
"trust land" or a "reservation"; rather, the test is whether the area has
been "validly set apart for the use of Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the Government. "2 The Court in Potawatomi re-
affirmed the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but it did not deprive the
193. Indian Country U.S.A. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir.
1987).
194. 660 P.2d 625 (Okla. 1983).
195. Id. at 631.
196. Id. at 627.
197. 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
198. Id. at 910.
199. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
200. Id. at 648-49.
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State of a remedy in connection with its right to tax the Tribes's sales
of goods to non-tribal members. 20'
In Oklahoma, as well as other states with tribal nations situated within
state boundaries, 202 tribal authority should govern the CAA on tribal
lands held by both tribal and non-tribal members. This is the most
logical legal conclusion because of the following: (1) the tests the
Supreme Court has put forth regarding "reservations" and "Indian
country;" (2) Congress' express delegation of power to Indian tribes to
administer and enforce the CAA on Indian lands; and (3) the tribes'
argument that states lack jurisdiction over environmental matters because
environmental regulation will affect the health and welfare of tribal
members. Any attempt by DOH to strip regulatory power from the
Indian tribes will only result in a protracted and burdensome court
battle at both tribes' and taxpayers' expense.
V. Conclusion
Pollution neither knows nor respects sovereign borders. As a result,
its cumulative impact affects not only locally situated nations, but the
global community as well. Both tribes and states realize that environ-
mental integrity of entire ecosystems depends upon effective control and
regulation of pollution sources. Ecosystems cannot be regulated ade-
quately in political isolation.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 demonstrate Congress' intent
of promoting Indian self-government, which encompasses the goal of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. The
amendments authorize the EPA to treat Indian tribes as states and to
provide tribes grant and contract assistance for federal air protection
programs." Before a tribe may assume regulatory authority of air
protection programs, it must be recognized federally and must demon-
strate that it possesses the capability to carry out the functions of the
Act which fall within the tribe's jurisdiction.
Tribes may submit implementation plans. Such plans are subject to
the EPA Administrator's approval. Upon the approval and execution
of a TIP, the plan will apply to all areas within the exterior boundaries
201. Fotawatomi, IIl S. Ct. at 910. The Court suggested that the State may collect
cigarette taxes from wholesalers by seizing unstamped cigarettes or by assessing wholesalers
who supplied cigarettes to the stores. Id. at 912 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161-62 (1980)).
202. One might apprise the geographic situation as states situated around tribal nations.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (Supp. II 1990); see also Indian Environmental General
Assistance Program Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-497, 106 Stat. 3258 (to be codified at




of a tribe's reservation, 2 4 "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,"
unless the plan itself provides otherwise.2
The EPA was charged with publishing its proposed rules as to how
it would treat and govern air protection programs set up by tribes. The
EPA missed its May 15, 1992, deadline, but the notice inviting public
comments regarding the EPA's proposed economic incentive programs
(EIPs) has been published in the Federal Register.? Tribes must be
alerted to the EPA's proposed rules, as the rules identify key provisions
which must be included in the formulation of environmental programs.
Both tribal and state governments have vested interests in preventing
undesirable environmental consequences on tribal lands. Native Ameri-
cans realized the importance of interdependence when they initially
entered into relations with this country's forefathers. 207 Native Americans
relied to their detriment upon the agreements and treaties that were
made and subsequently breached when those agreements became incon-
venient to "civilization." A commentator notes:
First, we essentially said to the Indians, "Don't attack us
and in return you may occupy a reservation with federal
protection." Then we said, "We'll protect you only if you
move from the land we let you occupy." Subsequent to
removal we said, "If you want federal protection and assis-
tance, you've got to be like us." Finally, we declared to the
Indian, "You don't legally exist anymore."
The manipulative abuses arising from that initial extension of trust are
many.
204. Recall that the meaning of the term "reservation," determined in light of statutory
law and with reference to case law, is considered to be land formally set apart for the
use of Indians, even if the land has not been formally designated as a "reservation." See
supra text accompanying notes 171-76.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (Supp. 11 1990).
206. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,110 (1993). Written comments on the EPA's proposed action
must be received on or before April 26, 1993. If there is no request for a public hearing,
one will not be held. On or before March 12, 1993, the EPA should have received requests
to present oral testimony. Id.
207. Much has been written about the unfair bargaining positions of Indian tribes.
See, e.g., FRANCis PAUL PRUCHA, AMmUCAN INDIAN PoLicy IN ThE FORMATIVE YEARS
186-87 (1962); Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian
Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth." -
How Long is That?, 63 CAL. L. Rav. 601, 609 (1975). The Supreme Court recognized
that "[t]he Indian nations did not seek out the United States and agree upon an exchange
of lands in an arm's length transaction. Rather treaties were imposed upon them and they
had no choice but to consent." Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31
(1970).
208. Michael M. Pacheco, Note, Finality in Indian Tribunal Decisions: Respecting Our
Brothers' Vision, 16 AM. INDIAN L. Rnv. 119, 165 (1991).
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Native Americans view environmental degradation as another form
of destruction on the already dwindling tribal land base. Given the
illogical and inconsistent federal policies and court decisions, it is no
wonder that tribes regard environmental regulation as an act of tribal
self-preservation that cannot be entrusted to other governmental entities.
Self-determination is the rationale for recognizing tribes as the primary
entity in determining the future course of tribal and reservation affairs.
The 1990 Amendments provide a mechanism through which tribes may
continue their social legacy of preserving a part of the tribal land base
- the air. Tribal self-governance of the reservation environment takes
into account and is potentially more hospitable to unique tribal situations
and solutions. If that right is taken away, the social legacy which Native
Americ s have fought to preserve for hundreds of years will mean
nothing to future generations.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/5
